La decretazione d’urgenza, nella dinamica costituzionale attuale, assume sempre più i tratti di uno modo di produzione del diritto problematico, utilizzato dal Governo in via stabile per la definizione legislativa del proprio programma, invece che nei casi e secondo i presupposti previsti dall’art. 77 Cost.
Abstract: This paper analyzes critical issues in the procedure of converting a decree-law into law. In particular, it focuses on the problematic nature of the time taken by the government to adopt opinions on amendments submitted by parliamentary groups to the conversion bill. With a symmetrical reading between the procedure for the conversion of the decree-law and that for the approval of the budget law, the article, once verified the aporias of the function of the Government within the legislative procedure, proposes the constitutional revision for the introduction of the so-called ‘fixed date vote’. This follows the analysis of the guarantee function of the President of the Republic within the legislative process. Moreover, giving an account of the number of decree-laws approved in the first 8 months of the 19th legislature and the process of conversion of Decree-Law no. 44/2023, it points out that in addition to the so-called ‘de facto unicameralism’, there is a risk of giving rise to the phenomenon defined as ‘de facto monosedism’, the impossibility of further substantive examinations except for the one carried out in the Commission at a single Chamber.